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ABSTRACT 
 
Transparency continues to occupy a patchy and uneven place in EU and US relations in key 
economic and regulatory areas. This patchiness plays out in a variety of ways including in 
downgrading by the US of the EU in diplomatic and regional standing albeit non-expressly in 
recent times. The chapter explores the shifts in practices on transparency in EU-US cooperation 
from a legal perspective. It focuses on EU-US trade negotiations and data transfer cooperation. 
Transparency provides a useful point of departure as it is a common value and instrument for 
the US and EU, yet one that seems to be utilised very differently. Transatlantic relations 
increasingly show a tension between the government to government model of transparency. In 
the EU-US data protection regime of the Privacy Shield a complex constellation of subjects is 
emerging and its genuine enforcement appears open to significant doubt. In trade, the European 
Parliament increasingly attempts to participate and involve citizens’ rights in new EU-US 
negotiations and raise civil liberties, citizens’ mobility rights and public interest themes. In 
light of these developments, this chapter considers how EU and US are becoming divergent in 
how they handle both communication with each other and toward citizens. The EU is 
increasingly becoming an organised transparent actor toward the US and trying to increase 
transparency toward citizens through different instruments, whereas at the moment we see in 
the US a disruptive environment of information flows and an administration that disrupts the 
traditional lines of allies and non-allies in how it behaves.  
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1. Introduction  
 
In a digital age, practices of secret diplomacy appear increasingly outdated and impractical.  
The rise of transparency has exploded many practices and brought daylight upon power 
dynamics and complexities kept previously behind closed doors, particularly in trade 
negotiations. It is a powerful message of change that highly executive oriented bureaucracies 
have either ushered in or even transitioned in. Demands for greater transparency give more 
information and oxygen to new constellations of power. In the EU context, the depth of new 
information powers has given force to already newly empowered actors in foreign affairs. 
Transparency and openness are at the heart of the EU’s efforts to become a nascent 
transnational democracy but are convulsed by (crumbling) exceptions.1 The EU’s international 
relations are increasingly conducted with higher levels of transparency, openness and 
participation, making a sharp break with conventional international practices.2 On the other 
side of the pond, the US has witnessed many domestic transparency policies already since the 
70s yet foreign affairs have traditionally withstood the transparency pressure. The traditional 
modus operandi of the US of discreetness and secrecy in conducting foreign affairs has been 
disrupted by an era of unprecedented insights into US Executive diplomacy through the 
President use and engagement with Twitter. 
 Transatlantic relations between the EU and US have developed since post WW2 and 
have until recently across administrations sought to integrate and engage in many forms of 
significance deepening in their collaborations. Yet Transatlantic Relations have never been the 
subject of such a complex political alliance as in the post-Trump era. In 2019, the US 
apparently downgraded the EU’s diplomatic status without notifying the European Union, later 
reversed.3 While its precise political and diplomatic effects are debatable and even unknowable 
in the short term, it constitutes a striking example of the loss of transparency in EU-US relations 
                                                     
1 A. Bianchi, ‘On Power and Illusion: The Concept of Transparency in International law’ in A. Bianchi and A. 
Peters (eds) Transparency in International Law (OUP 2013) 1; A. Von Bogdandy, ‘The European Lesson for 
International Democracy: The Significance of Article 9 to 12 EU Treaty for International Organizations’ (2012) 
23(2) EJIL 315; See D. Curtin, ‘The Role of Judge-Made Law and EU Supranational Government: A Bumpy 
Road from Secrecy to Translucence’ in E. Spaventa et al (eds), Empowerment and Disempowerment of the EU 
Citizen (Hart 2012); V. Abazi & D. Curtin ‘The EU Security Exception: Beyond Control?’ in C. Harlow et al. 
(eds) Research Handbook on EU Administrative Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017) ; V. Abazi & J. 
Adriaensen, Allies in Transparency? Parliamentary, Judicial and Administrative Interplays in the EU’s 
International Negotiations (2017) 5(3) Politics and Governance 5; The Global Dimension of the EU’s AFSJ: On 
Internal Transparency and External Practice’ NYU Jean Monnet Working Paper series (2018/4). 
2 Abazi, V. and M. Hillebrandt, 2015, “The legal limits to confidential negotiations: Recent case law developments 
in Council transparency: Access Info Europe and In’t Veld”, Common Market Law Review 52, 825–845. 
3 See New York Times ‘U.S. Downgraded E.U.’s Diplomatic Status (but Didn’t Say Anything)’ (8 January 2019). 
 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/08/world/europe/eu-us-diplomatic-status.html  
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bilaterally. It is striking arguably because it is symptomatic of a broader breakdown in 
communications in interactions by the Trump administration and a general form of recklessness 
emerging as to the US engagement with past allies on the part of the Trump administration, as 
a key marker of its strategic communications (or lack thereof) with the global legal order. The 
lack of notification demonstrated the increasingly hostile engagement of the US with the EU 
and the precarious state of transatlantic relations. What is all the more significant is the lack of 
clarity and transparency in the ordinary business of diplomacy with an ally.  The manner in 
which the lack of communication takes effect is an important turning point in transatlantic 
relations. 
This chapter aims to analyse and identify the points of tension in transparency between 
the EU and US, especially in what it calls the government-to-government transparency. 
Transparency is meant to be a model of openness from governments towards citizens as a wave 
of good governance and democratic principles became key in guiding decision-making, 
including in international relations.4 Opening up international negotiations for example was 
often pushed back by governments with the explanation that such level of openness would lead 
to loss of candour between the negotiating partners. It is precisely this openness at the 
negotiating table that the paper seeks to trace in the context of transatlantic relations and beyond 
that, transparency meant as a communication and explanations generally given between 
governments in international relations as part of diplomacy. As Farrell and Newman have 
outlined, over the last 70 years, the US has built a global system in which information, 
investment and trade move quickly and easily across borders.5 It is one which the EU has 
‘bought’ into over several decades of the Single Market’s development, internally and 
externally. The US openness generally to new communications and open systems has created 
an interdependent world. Yet in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the US began to exploit 
interdependence deliberately using its economic power as an instrument of national security. 
In the wake of these developments, subsequent US administrations continued to advance one 
of the most significant and ambitious trade negotiations of all time, the mega-regionals 
negotiations, in the shape of the in the form of Obama administration-led EU-US Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and Transpacific-Partnerships (TPP) Agreement 
negotiations, where transparency and wider participation in their negotiation became central, 
                                                     
4 See Abazi & Rosen, Introduction to this volume  
5 Henry Farrell & Abraham Newman (2016) The new interdependence approach: theoretical development and 
empirical demonstration, Review of International Political Economy, 23:5, 713-
736, DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2016.1247009; 
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arguably more so with the EU.6 2016 saw the demise of the TTIP and TPP free trade 
agreements as part of the mega-regionals, which the Trump Administration quickly moved to 
withdraw from TPP and abandon TTIP. 
While under the Trump administration collaboration with the EU in the TTIP negotiations has 
been officially frozen, key elements of transatlantic cooperation on data protection and the 
regulation of private companies in the US have continued to evolve despite the broader political 
conditions in the form of the EU-US Privacy Shield and EU-US Umbrella Agreement. In fact, 
EU-US data protection cooperation is some of the most sophisticated and far-reaching globally 
in terms of its span and partial institutionalisation across regimes, despite its complexity in 
marrying security and commercial issues and regulating surveillance issues embedded 
chaotically there between.7 These dual-faceted approaches- from trade contrasted with data- 
are notable and distinctive. They have put mutual communication and dialogue at the heart of 
their operation where citizen protection is key. Moreover, further trade cooperation has just 
begun to be mooted and negotiated between the two legal orders. However, EU institutional 
actors such as the European Parliament are increasingly raising transparency objections.  It is 
thus an opportune moment to reflect upon the broad-brush idea of transparency. Significant 
transparency gaps have been bridged in the regime of data through institutionalisation.8 Yet the 
number of institutional actors involved is still a cause of concern as to the form of flow of 
information across the institutions. Transatlantic Trade has recently been the subject of 
significant actions to institutionalise trade through a deepening. The specific interactions 
between the regimes of the EU and US in these domains are highly dynamic significant but 
also difficult to isolate and contrast in the abstract. Transparency provides a useful point of 
departure and specific mode of analysis of conduct and enables reflections to take effect on the 
broader regime.  
 The chapter traces the development of communications between the US and EU 
(Section 2) upon which it then focuses on transparency issues in two key economic and 
                                                     
6 See E. Benvenisti, ‘Democracy Captured: The Mega-Regional Agreements and the Future of Global Public Law’ 
GlobalTrust Working Paper Series 08/2015; Benedict Kingsbury, David M. Malone, Paul Mertenskötter, Richard 
B. Stewart, Thomas Streinz, and Atsushi Sunami (eds) Megaregulation Contested Global Economic Ordering 
After TPP (OUP 2019). 
7 See Henry Farrell & Abraham Newman Of Privacy and Power: The Transatlantic Struggle Over Freedom and 
Security (Princeton University Press 2019). 
 
8 See E. Fahey (ed) Institutionalisation beyond the Nation State: Data Privacy and Trade (Springer Law, 2018). 
Cf compare other domains  E. Fahey ‘The Evolution of transatlantic legal integration: truly, madly, deeply? EU-
US justice and home affairs’ in Florian Trauner & Adriadna Rippoll-Servent (eds.) Routledge Handbook on 
Justice and Home Affairs (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017). 
 
6 
 
regulatory fields: trade (Section 3) and data economy (Section 4). Lastly, it offers conclusions 
and insights for how transatlantic relations and transparency will continue to evolve (Section 
5).  
 
2. Mapping EU-US Communication: From Dialogue to Transparency  
  
One area of EU IR which constitutes a fascinating litmus test of the transparency in 
international relations is EU-US relations, especially trade relations. Transatlantic trade 
relations have evolved in a series of official and permanent dialogues not generally understood 
to operate as a model of transparency,9 including the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, 
Transatlantic Labour Dialogue, Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue and Transatlantic 
Environment Dialogue. They have variable degrees of success or failure and comprise public 
and private spheres, variable actors and activities.10 Their composition, use of law, tasks, 
operation and proximity to policy-makers varies considerably because of their non-
transparency (e.g. minimal web presence, absence of institutions, agendas). As a result, the 
taxonomy of this category appears difficult to gauge. The diversity of the subjects of 
transatlantic relations, between two of the world’s largest economies, one a state and the other 
an evolving region, is of immense significance in understanding communications between the 
regimes. The permanent dialogues are furthered by Annual Summits between EU and US 
leaders. A Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue is on-going since 1972.11 These in turn are 
supported by thematic entities such as the Transatlantic Economic Council and the EU-US 
Energy Council, as well as High Level Working Groups. EU and US Representatives cooperate 
particularly regularly and closely in foreign policy.12 Nonetheless, there is a particular 
significance to the role of non-opaque dialogues in generating rule-making in Transatlantic 
Relations, as wholly regularised and structured process of non-institutional law-making are 
perceived to have given certain economic actors privileged access to policy makers at the 
                                                     
9 Fahey, E. (2014), Transatlantic Dialogues. European Law Journal, 20: 368-384. doi:10.1111/eulj.12046. 
10 S Francesca Bignami and Steve Charnovitz, ‘Transnational Civil Society Dialogues’ in Mark Pollack and 
Gregory Shaffer (eds.) Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy (Rowman & Littlefield 2001).  
11 D. Jančić “Transatlantic Regulatory Interdependence, Law and Governance: The Evolving Roles of the EU and 
US Legislatures” (2015) (17) CYELS 334. 
12 For example, the High Representative and the US Secretary of State are reported to have daily contact and 
approximately 50 EU diplomats work as part of the EU delegation to the US in the European External Action 
Service 
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expense of other sectors of ‘transatlantic society’.13 They have long generated the question of 
their transparency and openness in their operation.  
There has been much cooperation between civil society across the Atlantic since the 
19th century to the present day, on topics ranging from peace to slavery. There are important 
differences in how US and EU interest groups are organised, at least up until recently.14 The 
history of the participation of civil society in EU-US relations has arguably been to privilege 
private actors in secret dialogue processes.15 The institutionalisation of civil society 
participation within the form of an Advisory Group within the EU-US TTIP negotiations EU-
US Cybercrime and security cooperation have shown how openness has become more in 
transatlantic relations, particularly as to information sharing and participation of a broader 
range of subjects but it is still highly variable.16   
EU-US relations had become particularly prominent in recent times not least in the 
Obama era when the coherence of the EU began to become more realised post Lisbon. The 
TTIP negotiations, on one of the largest trade deals in history would arguably have constituted 
an important attempt via the mega-regionals to deepen the agenda on global trade, in light with 
a multilateral agenda. However, under the current administration the US commitment to 
multilateralism has dramatically diverged away therefrom and instead a hostility to 
international organisations and multilateralism, from the withdrawal from the Paris Climate 
Accord to the Iran deal exhibit an entirely. The advent of the Trump administration has witness 
the EU adopt a Global Strategy explicitly committing to multilateralism.17  
The EU is explicitly and transparently committed in its treaties to being a distinctive 
‘globalist’ as a matter of law and to pursuing multilateral solutions.18 Transparency only 
operates as a latent entity here in its non-technical sense. Yet it also operates as a key 
communication tool of clarity, certainty, explicitness and directness with key partners about its 
                                                     
13 See Bignami and Charnovitz, ibid; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘Transformative Transatlantic Free Trade 
Agreements without Rights and Remedies of Citizens?’ (2015) Journal of International Economic Law 579 
14 Justin Greenwood and Alasdair Young , ‘EU interest representation or US-style lobbying?’ in Nicolas Jabko 
and Craig Parsons (eds.) With US or Against US? European trends in American Perspective (OUP 2005) 290. Cf 
A. Young, ‘Not your parents’ trade politics: The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations,’ 
(2016) 23(3) Review of International Political Economy 345; Ayelet Berman, ‘Taking foreign interests into 
account: Rulemaking in the US and EU’ (2017) 15(1) I-CON 235 
15 Bignami and Charnovitz above, 255 ; Green Cowles, ibid, 215. 
16 Acar Kutay, ‘Limits of Participatory Democracy in European Governance’ (2015) 21 European Law Journal 
803; Berman above.  
17 K Smith, Karen E. (2017) The European Union in an illiberal world. Current History, 116 (788). pp. 83-87; 
John Ikenberry, The end of liberal international order?, International Affairs, Volume 94, Issue 1, January 2018, 
Pages 7–23. 
18 Cf. Article 21 TFEU; A Taxonomy of the EU’s Global Approach to Law Making’ NYU Jean Monnet Working 
Paper series (2018/4). 
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core agenda. The manner in which the EU has used the explicitness of its multilateral agenda 
is notable- it operates as a ‘calling card’ for future partners but also signals how it wishes to 
engage in international organisations and in multilateral structures.  
Significant efforts have been made to procure transparency in transatlantic data transfer 
measures and in negotiations of trade, particularly from EU institutional actors. The European 
Parliament in landmark litigation won and lost a leading case on the leading base of EU-US 
Passenger Name Records, causing the EU to be forced into accepting a highly disadvantageous 
legal regime in the wake of the pyrrhic CJEU decision.19 An individual parliamentarian and 
member of the LIBE committee has been pivotal in litigating a range of transatlantic security 
issues in the post 9/11 period.20 Although the European Parliament vetoed the EU-US TFTP / 
SWIFT Agreement, finally reached in 2009, a second SWIFT agreement was reached in 2010. 
A request by MEP in ’t Veld to disclose a classified Council Service Legal Opinion suggesting 
that the earlier legal basis of the Agreement was flawed succeeded in part before the General 
Court recently, on the basis that the public interest did not require its suppression.21 The Court 
of Justice delivered a resounding victory in her favour later in 2014, weighing in against blanket 
institutional secrecy in the area of international relations.22  It is thus a significant time period 
in transatlantic relations, where many aspects of transparency are squarely the subject of 
challenge involving embryonic surveillance regimes and the subject of significant institutional 
debacles.  
There are significant shifts by all EU institutions and major actors as to their conduct 
of the global towards openness, contrary to the actual state of the current law, and thus of 
significance, in a range of areas, from trade to security often in key transatlantic contexts.23 
The Council of Ministers has begun to declassify negotiation mandates for international trade 
                                                     
19 E. Fahey ‘Between One-Shotters and Repeat Hitters: A Retrospective on the role of the European Parliament 
in the EU-US PNR Litigation’ in Fernanda Nicola & Bill Davies (eds.) EU Law Stories (CUP, 2017).  
20 See In ’t Veld v. Department of Homeland Security Case No 1:08-cv-0115-RMC, District Judge Collyer 
presiding (D.C.C, 15 December 2008); 
T-529/09, In ’t Veld v. Council [2012] ECR II-000. 
22 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, 13 February 2014; Case C-350/12 P Council of the European Union 
v Sophie in ’t Veld [2014] ECR-I 000. See E Fahey, ‘EU Foreign Relations Law: Litigating to Incite Openness in 
EU Negotiations’ (2014) 4 European Journal of Risk Regulation  pp. 553-556. See also Vigjilenca Abazi, 
Maarten Hillebrandt, 'The legal limits to confidential negotiations: Recent case law developments in Council 
transparency: Access Info Europe and In ’t Veld, V. Abazi and M. Hillebrandt' (2015) 52(3) Common Market 
Law Review 825. 
23 P. Leino, ‘Transparency, Participation and EU Institutional Practice: An Inquiry into the Limits of the Widest 
Possible’ (2014) 3 EUI Working Papers 2-3, 25-26 < http://cadmus.eui.eu//handle/1814/30580> accessed 31 
October 2019.  
23 P Leino, ‘On Knowledge as Power: The Transparency of EU Law-Making Procedures’ (EU Law Analysis; 10 
Jan 2016) <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2016/01/on-knowledge-as-power-transparency-of.html> 
accessed 31 October 2019.  
; D. Curtin and A. Meijer, ‘Does Transparency Strengthen Legitimacy?’ (2006) 11 Information Polity 109, 120.  
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agreements only after individual MEPs began to illegally leak negotiation texts as part of a 
wave of political and local opposition toward the secrecy of the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) and EU-Canada Economic Partnership Agreement (CETA) 
negotiations.24 The European Commission, along with a host of other actors (from the EP to 
the Ombudsman), has put transparency as a lead ideal in all EU international trade negotiations, 
reacting to political rather than legal principles albeit not in the latest EU-US negotiations.25 
The EP notoriously voted down the ACTA copyright agreement because of a lack of 
information using its newfound powers in the area of IR after the Treaty of Lisbon.26 From 
security and data transfers to migration, the Ombudsman is increasingly putting international 
relations at heart of work despite being excluded in her role from the Access to Documents 
Regulation, e.g. as to EU-US Passenger Name Records (PNR) (i.e. security), EU-Turkey 
relations (i.e. migration) or EU-Australia PNR (security):- an extraordinary array of decisions 
on EU international relations, despite the EU IR exception surrounding her role.27  The Brexit 
negotiations arguably constitute the culmination these developments where far-reaching 
transparency was practised by the EU at every point, placing negotiation documents and 
positions in the public domain and leading the political debate. The place of transatlantic 
relations remains a key pivot point in EU practice in the largest most far-reaching trade 
negotiations that did not come to fruition.  
 
3. Transparency and the Trade Negotiations: Transparency 2.0?   
The EU-US TTIP negotiations were arguably significant  because they ‘politicised’ entities or 
agencies in foreign affairs, previously only mere sub-units of the larger political process 
without an express mandate in international relations (e.g. Committee of the Regions, 
Ombudsman and organised civil society), often through transparency.28 These bodies notably 
insisted upon more input, participation and openness in the TTIP negotiations.29 Civil society 
                                                     
24 See E. Fahey, ‘On the Benefits of the TTIP Negotiations for the EU Legal Order: A Legal Perspective’ (2016) 
43(4) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 327; E da Conceição-Heldt, ‘Exploring the TTIP Transparency 
Paradox’ (2019) Comparative European Politics. 
25 E.g. European Commission, Factsheet: Transparency in EU Trade negotiations (2013) 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/june/tradoc_151381.pdf> accessed 31 October 2019.  
26 See D. Curtin, ‘Official Secrets and the Negotiation of International Agreements: Is the EU Executive 
Unbound?’ (2013) 50(2) CML Review 423.  
27 Access to documents of the institutions and decision of the European Ombudsman of 6 January 2015 closing 
her own initiative inquiry O1/10/2014/RA concerning the European Commission on dealing with requests for 
information and access to documents (Transparency). 
28 Case T-754/14, Efler and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2017:323. E. Fahey, ‘European Citizens Initiative 
STOP TTIP Can Proceed Says General Court’ (2017) 8 European Journal of Risk Regulation 787-790. 
29 Fahey, ibid. 
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was increasingly politicised through TTIP. For example, the gathering of 3,284,289 million 
signatories for a European Citizens Initiative (ECI) on the TTIP, from a range of Member States 
marked an important step in the mobilisation of ordinary citizens against the TTIP itself as an 
act of politicisation through activist networks and NGOs, expressing transnational protest. The 
European Parliament gained significant information rights in the TTIP negotiations through 
working with other institutional actors.  Although the ECI was rejected for ostensibly 
procedural reasons, a European Citizens Initiative (ECI), supported by the President of the 
European Parliament, STOP TTIP and CETA with over 3 million signatories succeeded. A 
General Court decision on the propriety of stopping such trade negotiations has put vibrancy 
into the idea that citizens can meaningfully contest global governance at European level. It has 
created a specific climate for transparency which is significant and contributed in no small way 
to the further democratisation of EU foreign relations. It is worth mentioning transparency in 
transatlantic relations is of significance because of the concrete shifts taking place in practice.  
Initially the Regulatory Cooperation Chapter was the most controversial aspect of the 
TTIP negotiations because of the broadening of subjects in transatlantic relations where 
transparency played a significant part. The TTIP negotiations spanned many forms30 and 
caused more puzzlement than controversy throughout 15 rounds of negotiation because of its 
policy span, in the absence of any clear vision of horizontal or vertical forms of 
accountability.31 The objectives of the TTIP Regulatory Chapter included: to establish and 
reinforce bilateral regulatory cooperation, to promote an effective regulatory environment, 
compatible regulatory approaches and implementation thereof.32 The European Commission 
initially proposed an institutionalised framework for the TTIP, which would have strong 
institutions in order to make it ‘living agreement’ and accelerates the transatlantic development 
of global approaches. It then raised the thorny question as to what a living agreement could or 
should entail.33 An EU Textual proposal on Regulatory Cooperation in 2015 proposed a 
                                                     
30 A. Alemanno and J. Wiener, ‘The Future of International Regulatory Cooperation:  TTIP as a Step Toward a 
Global Policy Laboratory’, (2015) 78 Law and Contemporary Problems 103 ; Joana Mendes, ‘Participation in a 
new regulatory paradigm: collaboration and constraint in TTIP’s regulatory cooperation’ IILJ Working Paper 
2016/5 (MegaReg Series); R.T Bull, N.A Mahboubi, B.S.Richard, and J.B Wiener ‘New Approaches to 
International Regulatory Cooperation: The Challenge of TTIP, TPP and Mega-Regional Trade Agreements’ 
(2015) 78 Law and Contemporary Problems 1 ; A Alemanno, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership  
(TTIP) and Parliamentary Regulatory Cooperation (April 10, 2014). European Parliament Policy Report, Brussels, 
April 2014. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2423562  
46 21 March 2016 draft (in Article x1) .’ a high level of protection of inter alia public health, health and safety, 
animal welfare, the environment, consumers, social protection and social security, personal data and cyber 
security, cultural diversity and financial stability whilst facilitating trade and investment.’ 
32 March 2016 draft, ibid.  
33 See Article 43 of the Directives for the negotiation on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
between the EU and US, 11103/13 DCL 1 (Brussels, 17 June, 2013): See M. Bartl & E. Fahey, ‘A Postnational 
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Regulatory Cooperation Body (RCB) with powers of monitoring, powers to prepare proposals 
or initiatives, reporting to the Joint Ministerial Body. By March 2016, however, the RCB had 
evolved into a mere ‘institutional mechanism’, seeking to downgrade its significance.34 The 
textual proposal of March 2016 provided for considerably more emphasis upon learning 
processes and exchanges and extensive participation.35 Indeed, the sheer number of bodies and 
people potentially involved or whose participation was called for in ex ante and ex post review 
(thus going beyond previous proposals for ex ante horizontal review between regulators) then 
began to raise concerns as to the cost and workability of such levels of participation.36 This 
form of proposed institutionalisation reached after 15 rounds of negotiation differs from 
historical EU-US regulatory cooperation and makes it remark-worthy embracing a significant 
openness and transparency agenda.37  
In early 2019, the Commission issued two draft mandates for trade negotiations with 
the US, pending approval by the Council in turn pending the resolution of the EP a few months 
after the 2018 EU-US Summit.38 The member states were divided on the opening of the 
negotiations with the Trump administration given the withdrawal of the US from the Paris 
accord on Climate Change and the sensitivity of global trade in French domestic politics, riven 
by gilet jaunes strife. The complexities on future transatlantic trade this time are not limited to 
                                                     
Marketplace: Negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)’ in E. Fahey and D. Curtin, 
A Transatlantic Community of Law (CUP 2014). 
34 Arguably it envisaged an executive dominated structure of officials tasks with charting TTIP’s evolution, 
through an annual Regulatory Cooperation programme, to outline priorities, suggest new joint initiatives, with 
reviews only at ministerial level regularly, reporting to the EU-US Summit to legislators every two years, thereby 
skewing political accountability. 
35 e.g. natural or legal persons may jointly submit concrete and sufficiently substantiated proposal, including from 
public interest bodies (Article x 5 (2)). 
36Cf  Elaine Fahey, ‘The TTIP Negotiations Innovations: On Legal Reasons for Cheer’ (Verfassungblog, 24 Aug. 
2016) available at <http://verfassungsblog.de/the-ttip-negotiations-innovations-on-legal-reasons-for-cheer> 
accessed;  
37 A final EU Proposal for Institutional, General and Final Provisions was tabled in 2016.  
38 Brussels, 18.1.2019 COM(2019) 15 final Recommendation for a COUNCIL DECISION authorising the 
opening of negotiations of an agreement with the United States of America on conformity assessment ; Brussels, 
18.1.2019 COM(2019) 16 final Recommendation for a COUNCIL DECISION authorising the opening of 
negotiations of an agreement with the United States of America on the elimination of tariffs for industrial goods 
ANNEX I Joint U.S.-EU Statement following President Juncker's visit to the White House, Washington, 25 July 
2018 NOTE FOR THE TPC/INTA EU-US Relations: Interim Report on the work of the Executive Working 
Group 30 January 2019: 
‘This is why we agreed today, first of all, to work together toward zero tariffs, zero non-tariff barriers, and zero 
subsidies on non-auto industrial goods. We will also work to reduce barriers and increase trade in services, 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, medical products, as well as soybeans. This will open markets for farmers and 
workers, increase investment, and lead to greater prosperity in both the United States and the European Union. It 
will also make trade fairer and more reciprocal. Secondly, we agreed today to strengthen our strategic cooperation 
with respect to energy. The European Union wants to import more liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the United 
States to diversify its energy supply. Thirdly, we agreed today to launch a close dialogue on standards in order to 
ease trade, reduce bureaucratic obstacles, and slash costs.’ 
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the States. Much significance now lies in the place of transparency and the role of the European 
Parliament in taking it forward. 
In the latest EU-US trade negotiations talks the EP expressed considerable disquiet over 
the role of the EP in the launch of the negotiations and the executive dominance of the 
negotiations in the absences of consultation. The EP has been regularly participating in a 
Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue with the US Congress for several decades, a joint committee 
composed of Members of the European Parliament and Members of US Congress.39 The 
formula of words used in a EP Resolution on the opening of the EU-US trade talks is also of 
significance- regretting the lack of involvement of the EP in the opening of the negotiations, 
its lack of knowledge thereof. However, the length of issues raised by the EP against the US 
on the state of EU-US relations in September 2018 runs to 95 paragraphs, from visa waiver, to 
the environment and was indicative of the often rising force of transparency and openness in 
the broadest sense.40 
 
4. Transparency and the EU-Us Privacy Shield Regime 
 
4.1 The EU-US Privacy Shield 
The Safe Harbour Agreement was an important departure for transatlantic relations with a so-
called ‘hybrid’ style governance founded upon non-institutionalisation where the private sector 
was the primary subject and object of the regulation of transatlantic data flows.41 The Safe 
Harbour principles, as endorsed by the European Commission in a Decision,42 were until 
recently the only ‘binding’ and enforceable element of the relationship between the EU, the 
US, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and certification bodies. The essence of Safe 
                                                     
39See D Jancic, ‘The European Parliament and EU-US Relations: Revamping Institutional Cooperation?’ in Fahey 
and Curtin, ‘A Transatlantic Community of Law’  (n 33).  
40 European Parliament, Resolution of 12 September 2018 on the State of EU-US relations, 2017/2 Trn271(INI); 
European Commission, Joint U.S.-EU Statement following President Juncker's visit to the White House, July 
2018 ; Draft Motion for a Resolution on the recommendations for opening of trade negotiations between the EU 
and the US, 2019, 3537(RSP); European Parliament, Draft Motion for a Resolution on the recommendations for 
opening of trade negotiations between the EU and the US, 2019, 3537(RSP); European Commission, Report on 
the Implementation of the Trade Policy Strategy Trade for All - Delivering a Progressive Trade Policy to Harness 
Globalisation, 2017; European Commission, State of the Union 2017, 2017 
41 Cf Gregory Schaffer, ‘Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals: The Prospects and Limits of New Approaches 
to Transatlantic Governance through Mutual Recognition and Safe Harbour Agreements’ (2002) 9 Columbia 
Journal of European Law 29, 77.  
42 Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbour privacy principles and related frequently 
asked questions issued by the US Department of Commerce, 2000/520/EC, OJ L 215 p 7). Article 25 of the 
Directive provided that Member States would prohibit all data transfers to a third country if the Commission did 
not find that they ensured an adequate level of protection.  
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Harbour was to require US companies to treat data of EU citizens as if the data were physically 
in Europe operating through a voluntary self-certification system with public enforcement 
conducted by the US FTC. The NSA surveillance saga resulted in an EU-US NSA Surveillance 
group and a momentum towards the significance of data transfers and surveillance.43 Decisions 
of the Court of Justice as to the Data Retention Directive44 culminated then in 2015 in Schrems 
v. Data Protection Commissioner45 a complaint to the Irish Data Protection Commissioner 
from an Austria law student as to the operation of the Safe Harbour Agreement. The CJEU, 
having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights,46 invalidated Safe Harbour.47 Shortly 
thereafter, the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation was adopted, giving substantial 
powers to national data protection authorities as well as individual citizens, within and in 
certain instances beyond the EU. The decision mostly impugned the light-touch regulation 
regime of Safe Harbour, highly secretive and complex to obtain citizen data.  
A new replacement for Safe Harbour in the form of the EU-US Privacy Shield 
agreement was adopted in 2016, in a highly non-transparent compilation of ‘letters’ forming 
the basis for the reformed regime.48 From its inception in 2016, the Privacy Shield, like the 
Safe Harbour, aims to protect the fundamental rights of EU citizens whose personal data is 
transferred to the United States for commercial purposes. It permits the transfer of data to 
companies that are certified in the United States under the Privacy Shield. The Privacy Shield 
is conveyed by the EU and US to be an improvement upon Safe Harbour and attempts to 
‘institutionalise’ transatlantic data processing through DPA, Ombudsman, Judicial authorities 
and follows closely existing EU-US data agreements. The guarantees provided by US 
                                                     
43 European Parliament Resolution of 23 October 2013 on the suspension of the TFTP agreement as a result of 
US National Security Agency surveillance (2013/2831(RSP)); European Parliament Resolution of 29 October 
2015 on the follow-up to the European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2014 on the electronic mass surveillance 
of EU citizens (2015/2635(RSP)); European Parliament Resolution of 12 March 2014 on the US NSA surveillance 
programme, surveillance bodies in various Member States and their impact on EU citizens’ fundamental rights 
and on transatlantic cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (2013/2188(INI)).  Report on the Findings by the 
EU Co-chairs of the Ad Hoc EU-US Working Group on Data Protection’, Council document 16987/13, 27 
November 2013 ; EU-US Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial Meeting of 18 November 2013, Council 16418/13, 
18 November, 2013; Commission, ‘Rebuilding Trust in EU-US Data Flows’ COM (2013) 846 final;  Commission, 
‘Communication on the functioning of the safe harbour from the perspective of EU citizens and companies 
established in the EU’ COM (2013) 847 final. 
44 In Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others EU:C:2014:238; Cf C 
131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja 
González EU:C:2014:317.  
45 Case C-362/14 Schrems v Data Commissioner, EU:C:2015:650.  
46 See Statement of the Article 29 Working Party on the implementation of the judgment of the ECJ of 6 October 
2015 in Case C-362/14 Schrems v Data Commissioner, EU:C:2015:650.  
 
48 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield 
(notified under document C(2016) 4176).  
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authorities in the Privacy Shield are stronger and put citizens more at the heart thereof than 
previously. From an EU perspective the shift is intended to be more towards institutionalisation 
beyond private regimes and towards greater accountability. As far as the commercial 
dimension is concerned, the Privacy Shield has stricter obligations on certified companies 
receiving personal data from the EU, regarding limitations on how long a company may retain 
personal data or the conditions under which data can be shared with third parties outside the 
framework (accountability for onward transfers principle). Citizens’ rights are intended to be 
better protected through information rights, enforceable at national level. DPAs will acquire 
much significance, whereas US enforcement rests largely with the FTC and appears to strike 
an imbalance overall through divergent and disparate institutionalisation and enforcement.49 
The Department of Commerce provides more regular and rigorous monitoring. EU citizens 
have enlarged possibilities to obtain redress. An Ombudsman has an oversight function 
whereby they report to the Secretary of State. With regards data protection and mass 
surveillance, the Privacy Shield also provides supposedly better guarantees that 
U.S. authorities’ access to personal data coming from Europe for national security, law 
enforcement and other public interest purposes are subject to clear limitations. On 5 July 2018, 
for example, the Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) 
recommended in a resolution that the Commission suspend the EU/U.S. Privacy Shield unless 
and until all defined corrective actions are taken by the US Department of Commerce, 
particularly as to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), an independent 
agency within the executive branch ensuring protection of privacy and civil liberties in the field 
of counterterrorism policies.  
Clearly, transparency of practices and openness remain core principles of evolution of 
the model of transatlantic cooperation. Knowledge, certainty and rules are increasingly sought 
after. It is a good example of institutionalised cooperation in composite levels, where there is 
increasing communication and certainty through transparency practices. The regimes 
themselves are not the precise focus, it is assumed that there are variable ad debateable levels 
of institutionalisation. Instead, it is the nature of the communications which is of significance 
and the communication and information flows.  
 
                                                     
49 Article 29 Working Part Opinion 1/2016 on the EU-US Privacy Shield Draft Adequacy decision 13 April 2016 
WP 238; European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion on the EU-US Privacy Shield Adequacy Decision 30 
May 2016, Opinion 4/2016 European Parliament Resolution on transatlantic data flows (26 May 2016) 
2016/2727(RSP).  
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4.2: Inter-regime communications: Reviews of the Privacy Shield of 2016 and 2017 
 
The Privacy Shield is the subject of a detailed new regime predicated upon information 
exchange between layers of institutional actors with oversight and accountability structures. A 
strengthened monitoring of the framework has been established, with annual joint reviews by 
EU and US authorities to monitor the correct application of the arrangement discussed next. 
The first review took place on 18 and 19 September 2017 in Washington, DC. The second one 
took place on 18 and 19 October 2018 in Brussels. On the US side, this involved the US 
Secretary of Commerce, as well as representatives of the Department of Commerce, the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC), the Department of Transportation, the Department of State, the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Justice. Representatives 
of official bodies enjoying some degree of independence, like the Ombudsperson, a Member 
of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) and the Office of the Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community, also participated. The American Arbitration 
Association, acting as administrator of the Privacy Shield Arbitration Panel, and offering 
independent dispute resolution under the Privacy Shield is also represented. Finally, some 
Privacy Shield-certified companies are invited to provide some input during the annual review. 
On the EU side, it comprised the Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, 
representatives of the Commission’s Directorate General for Justice and Consumers, and on 
the other, the Chair of the European Data Protection Board (EDPB)50 and representatives 
designated by the EDPB. 
 The unique difference in the new regimes is that now the Commission makes its own 
evaluation of how data transferred from the EU to the US is protected. This action is predicated 
upon distinctive information flows and clarity of communication as between the parties. It is a 
form of experimental governance or learning which is interesting and fruitful to consider. Thus 
The Commission’s findings have been summarized in two reports, published in 2017 and 
2018,51 after the annual reviews. These reports are based on the discussions held during the 
annual review but are also informed by a study commissioned by the Commission, which takes 
into consideration publicly available material, such as: court decisions; implementing rules and 
procedures of relevant U.S. authorities; annual reports from independent recourse mechanisms; 
                                                     
50 The European Data Protection Board has replaced the Article 29 Working Party on 25 May 2018, as requested 
by the General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation 2016/679).  
51 First Annual Review of the EU-US Privacy Shield, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-
protection/international-dimension-data-protection/eu-us-data-transfers_en, accessed 31 October 2019. Second 
Review of the EU-US Privacy Shield, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/international-
dimension-data-protection/eu-us-data-transfers_en, accessed 31 October 2019. 
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transparency reports issued by Privacy Shield-certified companies through their respective 
trade associations; reports and studies from NGOs active in the field of fundamental rights and 
in particular digital rights and privacy; press articles and other media reports. The Commission 
is not dependent on assertions made by US authorities when evaluating the framework and this 
is worth considering as to the study of the principles and requirements of the CJEU in Schrems 
giving rise to the regime. It thus constitutes a broader and wider form of governance, involving 
learning and information sharing across institutions and actors. Thus, this improved assessment 
mechanism, as well as the guarantees provided by the US government, are supposed to prevent 
the Privacy Shield from another invalidation.52 However, the Commission’s role is still 
ambiguous and its decisions with regard the Privacy Shield remain fragile, because they are 
dependent upon decisions taken at US level and discussed within an transatlantic framework.  
 
4.3: Bureaucratic Divergence: Information Flow in the Privacy Shield Review Process 
The Privacy Shield review process is significant in that the outcome of both review processes 
is that the Commission approves of the U.S. authorities having put in place structures and 
procedures enabling the proper functioning of the Privacy Shield which ensure an adequate 
level of protection for Privacy data. It is important to note that the two annual conclusions to 
date at the time of writing have strictures of conditionality on them concerning the review and 
report and the recommendations to accept those reviews based upon US information, actions 
and processes and ensure a trustworthy flow of information. It is not the only form of 
assessment taking place here. In addition, reports of the WP Article 29 and the European Data 
Protection Board and external independent assessments are unified in the concerns that they 
express. The nature of the limits of the review process conducted appear acutely from the ‘black 
hole’ of information that the Commission draws from and feedbacks to. The limited number 
of actors involved in this specific review process is also of interest, made all the more clear 
from the external judgments of the process by other independent actors.53 In the review, the 
Commission considered the mechanisms introduced by the Department of Commerce to 
proactively monitor compliance by certified companies. After a recommendation made by the 
                                                     
52 Arguably there are strong parallels here with the EU-US governance arrangements as to the SWIFT (EU-US 
TFTP  50 Agreement), involving similar learning, exchanges, time periods of governance etc: Marieke de Goede 
& Mara Wesseling ‘Secrecy and security in transatlantic terrorism finance tracking’ (2017) Journal of European 
Integration, 39:3, 253-269,  M. De Goede, ‘The SWIFT Affair and the Global Politics of European Security’ 
(2012) JCMS, 50: 214-230. 
53 Cf European Data Protection Board, EU-US Privacy Shield, Second Annual Review 2019, 
https://edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/our-documents/other/eu-us-privacy-shield-second-annual-joint-review-
report-22012019_en, accessed 31 October 2019.  
.  
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Commission in its first Report, the certification process has been ameliorated by the 
Department of Commerce in order to prevent US companies from claiming compliance with 
the Privacy Shield before the procedure has been finalised by the. The Department of 
Commerce has introduced new tools, such as a quarterly review of entities that have been 
identified as more likely to make false claims which enabled the Department of Commerce to 
cases of false claims to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). This thus is a significant 
development relating to the core weakness identified as to the Safe Harbour regime.  The 
Commission also invited the Department of Commerce to better check whether certified 
companies actually comply with the Privacy Shield principles, which lead the Department of 
Commerce to introduce new enforcement mechanisms.  Accordingly, while the FTC has been 
shown to be more active in its enforcement approach to compliance monitoring, the FTC also 
started to investigate into the Facebook / Cambridge Analytica case and much information 
about its recent work is yet lacking, says the Commission in its 2018 Report. Most recently, 
the Commission also asks the Department of Commerce, together with the FTC and the DPAs, 
to develop guidance on the Privacy Shield principles including to interpret key concepts 
thereof.  
Under the Privacy Shield, EU citizens are intended to enjoy strengthened possibilities 
to obtain redress in case of an illegal use of their personal. In the US regime complaint-handling 
and enforcement mechanisms and procedures to safeguard individual rights have been 
introduced through two mechanisms, an arbitration panel and the Ombudsperson mechanism. 
While an Acting Ombudsperson was designated in January 2017, the nomination of a 
permanent Ombudsperson was still pending in late 2018, which lead the Commission to fix a 
deadline of early 2019. The appointment of a permanent Ombudsman began to take effect in 
early 2019 after considerable EU pressure, albeit not complete at the time of writing. So far, 
the Ombudsperson has not received any request, except one complaint that has first been 
submitted to the Croatian data protection authority. 
As far as surveillance is concerned, limitations and safeguards result from Presidential 
Policy Directive 28, issued in 2014.54 The Commission proposed to include them in section 
702 of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which was re-authorized at the 
beginning of 2018. This was not taken over by the US administration and Congress. On the 
other hand, the powers of the U.S. Intelligence Community to acquire foreign intelligence 
                                                     
54 Presidential Policy Directive 28: Signals Intelligence Activities, 2014, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=748332.  
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information by targeting non-U.S. persons have not been expanded and the Commission 
appears satisfied with this outcome. Appointments as to the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board required by the new EU-US regime have been made as requested by the 
Commission in its 2017 Report, confirmed by the US Senate in 2018. The Commission had 
also recommended the public release of the Board’s report on Presidential Policy Directive 28, 
done in late 2018. However, the Commission has no real power to confirm the assertion made 
in the PCLOB Report that the PPD28 is fully applied across the Intelligence Community. The 
latter reinforces the significance of the understanding the significance divergences between 
headline or top-level actions and their communicated understandings of information flows. It 
further reinforces the need to understand the institutional dynamics between the two 
administrations or regimes as being multi-level and composite, relying upon a vast network of 
actors and enforcers to similar degrees. The nature of the information flows here is also of 
significance, where it is complex to question for those in lower-level enforcement actions and 
regimes.  
 
5. Conclusion: The shifting transparency practices of transatlantic relations  
 
Through mapping formal and informal communications, agreements and other forms of 
transatlantic cooperation, this chapter aimed to show the importance of transparency in how 
EU and US have cooperated and the current shaky waters in which this relation is taking place. 
Transatlantic relations have traditionally operated as an open space for innovation and broad-
scale law-making interactions not inhibited by law-making conventions. The 
institutionalisation of transatlantic data in the form of the Privacy Shield constitutes a 
significant development in inter-regime communications and the flow of information. With a 
vast range of subjects, the regime is an important study of certainty, clarity and communication 
between actors. By contrast, the significant shift away from institutionalisation and the more 
limited construction of subjects in the latest transatlantic trade negotiations shows a web of 
cooperation far apart. Transparency offers a unique insight into understanding inter-regime 
communications in order ‘to connect the dots’ and study these evolving subjects in different 
regimes.  
The place of transparency continues to radically evolve in international relations even 
if it is not consistently appreciated or understood. The contours of transparency, pertaining to 
a vast range of meanings, actions and entities, shows its dynamism and the necessity to engage 
in broad-ranging study thereof. The manner in which the US has sought to engage bilaterally 
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with EU Member States instead of the EU and even to ‘dis-acknowledge’ it is particularly 
remarkable. The shifts in transparency and crumbling exceptions thus represent important 
developments. Communications and the lack thereof have also have exposed highly variable 
transparency practices, oscillating between friend and foe. Diplomatic recognition issues, tariff 
wars, new trade negotiations have put an extraordinary strain on one of the most exceptional 
alliances in global governance. Digital diplomacy and the openness of engagement even with 
hostility marks this era. Yet closer cooperation between the two in newly institutionalised 
regimes of cooperation is also significant, demonstrating highly distinctive flows of 
information. They necessitate careful reflection about the shifting modes of transparency in 
institutionalised and non-institutionalised regimes or areas of cooperation under negotiation 
between the EU and US long-term. One significant feature of this new era irrespective of its 
outcome is the evolving place of openness and transparency of the evolving relationship and 
the flexibility of practice. Now, a significant gap is opening up in transatlantic practices in core 
areas of global governance institutions, where the transatlantic alliance had been forged e.g. 
WTO reform in particular or in the field of investment law reform bilaterally and multilaterally. 
Data institutionalisation has been one area of significant distance and closeness in EU-US 
relations recently (Privacy Shield, Umbrella Agreement in contrast to cloud computing and 
technology merger control), but with limited multilateral agendas.  
This chapter showed that transatlantic relations have led to increased transparency 
initiatives for the EU towards its citizens and becoming a more organised actor in international 
relations since pressures from European Parliament, civil society and citizens directly was 
mounting toward pushing the EU in this direction. Yet on the other side of the pond, at 
Presidential level, transparency has been replaced by uncertainty and Twitter diplomacy and 
whilst efforts have been made to maintain levels of institutionalisation, the cases analysed here 
of trade and data economy show incoherence in US’s approach. How transatlantic transparency 
will evolve remains also to a large extent contingent on what the next U.S. elections will result, 
yet it is already clear that transatlantic regime produces distinctive transparency practices that 
should continue to be further studied and analysed.   
 
 
 
